The Unexplained Intellect: Complexity, Time, and the Metaphysics of Embodied Thought
Abstract:
The Unexplained Intellect: Complexity, Time, and the Metaphysics of Embodied Thought argues that the most basic facts about a mind cannot just be facts about mental states, but must include facts about the dynamic, interactive mental occurrences that take place when a creature encounters its environment.
The discussion begins by examining the mathematics of computational complexity, arguing that the results from complexity theory create a puzzle about how human intelligence could possibly be explained.
It then uses the tools of analytic metaphysics to draw a distinction between mental states and dynamic mental entities, and shows that, in order to answer the complexity-theoretic puzzle about intelligence, dynamic entities must be understood to be among the most basic of mental phenomena. The picture of the mind that emerges has important implications for our understanding of intelligence, of action, and of the mind’s relationship to the passage of time.
The discussion begins by examining the mathematics of computational complexity, arguing that the results from complexity theory create a puzzle about how human intelligence could possibly be explained.
It then uses the tools of analytic metaphysics to draw a distinction between mental states and dynamic mental entities, and shows that, in order to answer the complexity-theoretic puzzle about intelligence, dynamic entities must be understood to be among the most basic of mental phenomena. The picture of the mind that emerges has important implications for our understanding of intelligence, of action, and of the mind’s relationship to the passage of time.
Chapter 1 - Elements of mind
The philosophy of mind is very often concerned with the explanation of facts that are obvious. One of these is the fact that mental states have content. The belief that Vancouver is north of Seattle has, as its content, the proposition that Vancouver is north of Seattle. If it had had a different content, it would have been a different belief. The having of that content is therefore essential to its being the particular belief that it is. Other mental states are related with equal intimacy to the propositional contents that they carry.
Despite this essential role for content, in giving mental states their identities, it may not be the case that every mental state has a content, whether propositional or otherwise. Perhaps there are certain pure sensations – such as tickles or twinges – that do not carry content by themselves (Block 1995). Perhaps there are certain states in which, as in ‘East Coker’, one is ‘conscious, but conscious of nothing’ (Eliot 1944, see also Thompson 2015). Even among belief-like states, the having of content may not be absolutely necessary: illusions might occasion mental states that are contentless (Evans 1982, p. 173), but those states are nonetheless mental, and they are sufficiently belief-like to be the causes of sincere speech.
... cont.
Are You Curious Yet?
Research Interests: Philosophy of Mind, Intelligence, Embodied Cognition, Complexity, Philosophy of Mind, Space and Time and 2 more
Attention is Cognitive Unison
Some psychological phenomena can be explained by identifying and describing the processes that constitute them. Others cannot be explained in that way. In Attention is Cognitive Unison Christopher Mole gives a precise account of the metaphysical difference that divides these two categories and shows that, when current psychologists attempt to explain attention, they assign it to the wrong one. Having rejected the metaphysical approach taken by our existing theories of attention Mole then develops a new theory. According to this theory the question of whether someone is paying attention is not settled by the facts about which processes are taking place. It is settled by the facts about whether the processes that serve that person's task-- whichever processes those happen to be--are processes that operate in unison. This theory gives us a new account of the problems that have dogged debates about the psychology of attention since the middle of the twentieth century. It also gives us a new way to understand the explanatory importance of cognitive psychology's empirical findings. The book as a whole shows that metaphysical questions have a foundational role to play in the explanatory project of cognitive psychology. This volume is of interest to anyone engaged in current debates in the philosophy of mind and perception, and in cognitive science generally.
- The Unexplained Intellect -
Subtitle:Complexity, Time, and the Metaphysics of Embodied Thought
ISBN:ebook/epub 9781317294665 PDF 9781317294672
Author:Christopher Mole
Publisher:Taylor and Francis
Publish Date: 22/02/2016
The relationship between intelligent systems and their environment is at the forefront of research in cognitive science. The Unexplained Intellect: Complexity, Time, and the Metaphysics of Embodied Thought shows how computational complexity theory and analytic metaphysics can together illuminate long-standing questions about the importance of that relationship. It argues that the most basic facts about a mind cannot just be facts about mental states, but must include facts about the dynamic, interactive mental occurrences that take place when a creature encounters its environment.
In a discussion that is organized into four clear parts, Christopher Mole begins by examining the mathematics of computational complexity, arguing that the results from complexity theory create a puzzle about how human intelligence could possibly be explained. Mole then uses the tools of analytic metaphysics to draw a distinction between mental states and dynamic mental entities, and shows that, in order to answer the complexity-theoretic puzzle, dynamic entities must be understood to be among the most basic of mental phenomena. The picture of the mind that emerges has important implications for our understanding of intelligence, of action, and of the mind’s relationship to the passage of time.
The Unexplained Intellect is the first book to bring insights from the mathematics of computational complexity to bear in an enquiry into the metaphysics of the mind. It will be essential reading for scholars and researchers in the philosophy of mind and psychology, for cognitive scientists, and for those interested in the philosophical importance of complexity.
No comments:
Post a Comment